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Abstract 
The investigation of rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) in sport settings is 
growing, but controlled experimental field studies are sparse. In the limited extant 
literature, researchers have found that irrational (extreme, rigid, and illogical) self-talk 
leads to disrupted motor skill performance, compared to rational (non-extreme, 
flexible, and logical) self-talk. However, methodological limitations of past research 
and the absence of sport-relevant tasks limit the application of findings to athletic 
settings. Therefore, the current study examined the effects of rational and irrational 
self-talk on the pressured putting performance of amateur golfers, by adopting a 
controlled and field-based experimental study design. A two-way repeated-measures 
ANCOVA, controlling for baseline putting ability, revealed that golfers’ putting 
accuracy was significantly better when using rational self-talk than when using 
irrational self-talk. In addition, one-samples and paired-samples t-tests showed that 
golfers reported that rational self-talk was more usable than the irrational self-talk, 
and perceived the rational self-talk to be more facilitative than the irrational self-talk 
for their putting performance. The results are discussed with reference to potential 
explanatory mechanisms, study limitations, and future research needs.   
Keywords: CBT; self-statements; golf; experiment; beliefs.   
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Teeing up for success: The effects of rational and irrational self-talk on the putting 
performance of amateur golfers.  
Rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT) is a cognitive-behavioural 
psychotherapeutic (CBT) approach introduced by Albert Ellis in the 1950’s (Ellis, 
1957). In REBT, an individual’s emotional and behavioural responses (C) to events 
(A) are dependent on rational and irrational beliefs (B) about the event. This ABC 
framework is used therapeutically to help athlete’s understand that irrational beliefs 
drive unhealthy negative emotions and maladaptive behaviours, whilst rational beliefs 
drive healthy negative emotions and adaptive behaviours (Turner & Barker, 2014). 
Irrational beliefs are characterised as extreme, rigid, and illogical, and rational beliefs 
are non-extreme, flexible, and logical. Athletes are then encouraged to abandon their 
irrational beliefs in favour contextualof rational beliefs (Ellis & Dryden, 1997).   
The effectiveness of REBT for psychological health is well documented 
(David, Cotet, Matu, Mogoase, & Stefan, 2017) and the deleterious effects irrational 
beliefs for wellbeing and mental health is well supported (see Turner, 2016 for a 
review). Because irrational beliefs are associated with unhealthy negative emotions 
(e.g., anxiety, depression, rage) and consequent maladaptive behaviours (i.e., 
avoidance or escape-based behaviours), they are proposed to hinder goal attainment 
(Dryden & Branch, 2008). In contrast, because rational beliefs are associated with 
healthy negative emotions (e.g., concern, sadness) and consequent adaptive 
behaviours (i.e., approach or assertive behaviours), they are proposed to aid goal 
attainment (Dryden & Branch, 2008). But whilst the detrimental effects of irrational 
and rational beliefs on wellbeing and mental health are evident in literature, much less 
is known about the effects of irrational and rational beliefs on human performance, 
especially in sport (Turner, 2016).  
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Performance contexts such as elite sport are inherent with stressors (e.g., 
organisational, competitive, and personal; Weston, Thelwell, Bonds, & Hutchings, 
2009), and those who operate in such settings with rational beliefs are more likely to 
evidence psychological health and goal achievement (Turner, 2016). Researchers 
have reported the promising application of REBT across a variety of sports (e.g., 
soccer, archery, mixed-martial artists, squash). Studies have reported changes in 
emotional outcomes (e.g., reduced performance anxiety; Turner & Barker, 2013), 
psychological constructs indicative of enhance performance (e.g., enhanced self-
efficacy, perceived control, resilience, Deen, Turner, & Wong, 2017; Wood, Barker, 
& Turner, 2017a), physiological markers (e.g., reduced baseline Systolic Blood 
Pressure; Wood, Barker, Turner, & Sheffield, 2018) and objective markers of 
performance (e.g., Wood et al., 2017a) following REBT.   
But in the face of the promising findings that rational beliefs are beneficial for 
goal attainment, caution should be exercised in assuming that irrational and rational 
beliefs can influence acute motor performance (Turner, 2016). The evidence that 
rational beliefs enhance skilled motor performance is sparse and methodologically 
limited, relying on social validation data (e.g., Turner & Barker, 2013) and abstract 
performance tasks unrelated to the sporting environment (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 
1984). Limitations aside, one promising way in which researchers have tried to 
understand how irrational and rational beliefs may influence motor performance is by 
operationalizing beliefs through self-talk. In his only contribution to the sport and 
exercise psychology literature, Ellis (1994) outlined that REBT can be used to 
develop rational coping self-statements to aid sport and exercise participation. Ellis 
(1994) suggests writing the statements down, and thinking about them several times a 
day, and an example he uses is, "I'd very much prefer to be great at sports, but if I'm 
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not, I can still enjoy playing and never put myself down for losing” (p. 254). 
Therefore, the application of REBT principle via self-talk is not a new idea, but 
unfortunately has engendered scant research.  
 
In some of the limited extant research irrational and rational beliefs are used to 
form self-talk statements that help create rational self-talk (or self-statement) and 
irrational self-talk (or self-statement) conditions. Findings suggest that irrational self-
talk leads to significantly more errors and reduced behavioural efficiency in a mirror-
tracing task (Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Schill, Monroe, Evans, & Ramanaiah, 1978), 
and increased anxiety and reduced performance during a series of trail making tasks 
(Kombos, Fournet, & Estes, 1989). In contrast, the adoption of irrational compared to 
rational self-talk prior to and during an insolvable puzzle led to greater self-report 
anxiety, but no effects on task persistence (Rosin & Nelson, 1983). However, 
previous studies used imagined rather than real-life stressors, failed to include control 
groups (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984), and used leading self-statements about 
performance effects (i.e., statements would help/hinder performance; Schill et al., 
1978). In addition, the early studies recounted here do not use athletic tasks or recruit 
skilled performers, and therefore tell the reader little about the effects of irrational and 
rational self-talk on sports performance.  
The effects of self-talk strategies on sporting performance have been studied 
extensively, reporting positive moderate effects sizes (ES = .48; Hatzigeorgiadis, 
Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011). Amongst numerous variations of self-talk 
(e.g., instructional, ironic processing, motivational) one popular categorisation is the 
positive vs. negative valence, whereby positive self-talk equates to successful 
performances and negative self-talk leads to the contrary.   However, in a systematic 
RATIONAL SELF-TALK GOLF PERFORMANCE  	 6 
review of the self-talk literature (Tod, Hardy & Oliver, 2011), it appears that whilst 
positive self-talk is associated with successful outcomes, negative self-talk was 
unrelated to performance. Accordingly, researchers have alluded to the importance of 
self-talk function over valence (i.e., positive vs. negative), indicating negative self-
talk can help or hinder performance depending on individual differences, culture, and 
context (Weinberg, 2018).  This is salient because according to REBT theory when 
encountered with adversity, irrational/rational beliefs (i.e., irrational & rational self-
talk), emotions and behaviours are not defined in terms of valence, but instead 
functionality, that is ‘how helpful is what you are telling yourself in reaching your 
respective goal?’ (Hyland & Bdouszek, 2012). As such, the examination of irrational 
and rational self-talk, that is the intellectual insight of core beliefs offers a novel and 
valuable contribution to further explore the functional effects of self-talk on sporting 
performance.  
Overcoming many of the limitations of past research, Wood, Turner, Barker, 
and Higgins (2017b) examined the effects of irrational and rational self-talk on golf 
putting. Based in the laboratory, the study showed that novice golfers performed no 
better when using rational self-talk than when using irrational self-talk.  In addition, 
findings reported no differences in the motivational qualities of irrational or rational 
self-talk, as assessed by task persistence whilst tolerating discomfort. Although 
offering greater methodological rigour (e.g., competitive task scenario, controlling for 
baseline scores, objective markers of performance), the use of self-statements within 
an experimental setting reflects low ecological validity and the use of an unskilled 
sample makes it difficult to generalise the study findings to athletes. In sum, the 
motor performance implications of rational and irrational self-talk in sport remains 
unclear with past research offering contrasting findings. Some research shows that 
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irrational self-talk hinders motor performance (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984), whilst 
research employing more robust research methods has found no effects (e.g., Wood et 
al., 2017b).  
Gaining a greater understanding of whether and what extent rational and 
irrational beliefs influence athletic performance is important so that athletes, and 
practitioners who work with athletes, can be better informed about which beliefs to 
hold and endorse, or indeed abandon, in the pursuit of performance excellence.  The 
current study aims to examine the performance effects of rational and irrational self-
talk in golfers, addressing the shortcomings of past research in four main ways. First, 
the current study adopts a blinded repeated-measures crossover design to mitigate 
individual differences that may emerge through between-groups designs. Second, in 
line with the sport-specific model of self-talk (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2016), 
which posits that personal factors (e.g., skill level) and contextual factors (e.g., 
competitive environments) are related to self-talk and performance, the current study 
recruited competitive golfers to perform pressured golf-putting to ensure task 
engagement and reduce learning effects. Third, aligned with REBT theory this study 
examines the functional categorisation of irrational (i.e., dysfunctional) and rational 
(i.e., functional) self-talk on sporting performance. Finally, the current study employs 
field-based data collection rather than laboratory data collection to enhance the 
ecological validity of the study. Based on past research, it is hypothesised that rational 
self-talk will lead to greater golf putting performance from baseline compared to 
irrational self-talk. It is also hypothesised that rational self-talk will be perceived as 
more useful and more facilitative for golf putting performance than irrational self-
talk.  
Method 
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Participants  
Fifty-seven amateur golfers (Mage = 30.63, SD = 11.85; Mhandicap = 13.25, 
SD = 7.27, range: 0-28; Females = 17) were recruited from a golf club in the West 
Midlands, United Kingdom. Participants volunteered to take part after seeing an 
advertisement for the study on the golf club notice board. No inducement was offered 
for taking part, and all participants completed informed consent prior to any data 
collection. The study was approved by a University ethics committee prior to 
participant recruitment.  
Experimental Design 
In this study a within-subjects cross-over design was used, where all 
participants completed golf putting performances in baseline, rational self-talk, and 
irrational self-talk conditions. Specifically, participants completed baseline golf 
putting performance first (session 1), and then were randomly allocated to either 
rational self-talk or irrational self-talk conditions (session 2). Then, participants 
returned to complete the putting performance in the alternate condition (session 3). 
Participants self-selected which self-talk condition they experienced in sessions 2 and 
3 by selecting one of two sealed envelopes at the end of session 1. One envelope 
contained rational self-talk instructions, and the other contained irrational self-talk 
instructions. The contents of each envelope were unknown to the experimenter until 
all data had been collected.  
The development of the rational and irrational self-talk (see Figure 1) was 
undertaken by REBT-trained (primary practicum) sport and exercise psychology 
practitioners. All eight self-talk statements were closely aligned to contemporary 
REBT theory. The four rational self-talk statements reflected the four core rational 
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beliefs of REBT (preferences, anti-awfulizing, high frustration tolerance, self-
acceptance), and the four irrational self-talk statements reflected the four core 
irrational beliefs of REBT (demandingness, awfulizing, low frustration tolerance, 
depreciation). The rational and irrational statements contained the same contextual 
information (e.g., sink the putt, succeed, failing) to make sure that the statements were 
comparable, with the only differences between rational and irrational self-talk being 
the expression of rational or irrational beliefs.  
Sessions were 1-week apart and all sessions occurred at the same time of the 
week. A pre-self-talk baseline measure was deemed the most reliable way to obtain 
pre-manipulation putting performance because it was not possible to withdraw the 
self-talk once it had been administered. This baseline measure was important to 
determine the performance effects of rational and irrational self-talk over and above 
usual performance.  
Measures 
Golf putting performance. To measure golf putting performance, a pressured 
golf-putting task was developed for this study. Based on past research (Fearing et al., 
2011), a seven-foot (2.13-meter) length putt was used for the golf-putting task.  This 
was because research encompassing Professional Golf Association (PGA) putting 
statistics suggests that the likelihood of making a seven foot putt is 50% (Fearing et 
al., 2011). The putting task took place on a putting green at the golf club, offering a 
more ecologically valid assessment of golf putting compared to laboratory-based 
putting tasks used in some past research (e.g., Wood et al., 2017b). However, as 
environmental conditions cannot be controlled in the field, but can affect golf putting 
success, the speed of the green was measured before each session using a stimpmeter 
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(e.g., Mathers & Grealy, 2013). Data collection only commenced if the stimpmeter 
reading was between 7 and 12. At each of the three sessions (baseline, rational self-
talk, and irrational self-talk) each participant completed 15 performance putts that 
were recorded by the experimenter. Participants putted from the same place on the 
green for each putt, and number of successful putts was used as the performance score 
in the present study, such that a higher score indicated better putting performance. 
The putting task was made pressured by engendering ego threat in line with past 
research (Wilson, Wood, & Vine, 2009). This involved informing participants that 
each week for the next three weeks they were competing with all other participants in 
the study on the golf-putting task, and that their score would be visible on a league 
table in the club. Pilot testing utilised 25 performance putts, but pilot participants (n = 
5) indicated to the experimenter that this was too many and that they lost interest, and 
that 15 would be more appropriate. Prior to putting performance data collection in 
each session, participants completed 6 familiarisation putts on the green so that 
performance scores more accurately reflected performance rather than learning or 
warm-up effects.  
Self-talk usability. Following each self-talk session (sessions 2 and 3), 
participants were asked to indicate the usability of the self-talk they had used in the 
session on a Likert-scale from 0% (not usable at all) to 100% (extremely usable). This 
item was used to assess the applicability of the rational and irrational self-talk for the 
participants in the putting task.  
Self-talk performance facilitation. Following each self-talk session (sessions 
2 and 3), participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the self-talk they had 
used in the session was helpful for their putting performance on a Likert-scale from 
0% (not helpful at all) to 100% (extremely helpful). This item was used to assess the 
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perceived performance-facilitating effects of the rational and irrational self-talk in the 
putting task.  
Procedure    
Participants who contacted the experimenter in responses to the study 
advertisement at the club were invited to read the information form about the study, 
and complete a consent form if they wished to take part. After consent had been 
confirmed, participants completed a short questionnaire comprising some 
demographic questions (age, sex, handicap). The participant was then invited to 
session 1 at a mutually agreed time convenient for them to attend for three 
consecutive weeks (session the three sessions).  
In line with a similar study (e.g., Wood et al., 2017b) participants attended 
individually on three separate occasions. First, completing a baseline condition (A; no 
self-statements), then completing irrational (B) and rational (C) self-talk conditions in 
a randomised order. In session 1, participants were instructed that each week for the 
next three weeks they were competing with all other participants in the study on a 
golf-putting task, and that their score would be visible on a league table in the club. 
This was to increase ego threat in the golf-putting task. Participants were invited to 
ask any questions they may have, and then completed 6 familiarisation putts, after 
which the experimenter emphasised to the participant that the next fifteen putts would 
be measured and used for the competition this week. After the fifteen performance 
putts, the participant was reminded about their second session, and were asked to 
select one of two envelopes labelled “1” and “2”. The experimenter was blinded to the 
content of each envelope but recorded their selection so that in the next session the 
participant would use the contents of their selected envelope as their self-talk. One 
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envelope contained rational self-talk instructions, and the other envelope contained 
irrational self-talk instructions.  
In session 2, participants were reminded of the competitive nature of the golf-
putting task, and completed 6 practice putts as in session 1. Then, prior to the 15 
performance putts, participants were given their previously selected envelope and 
asked to read the statements on the paper inside. The researcher walked away from 
the participant and asked the participant to return the paper into the envelope after 5-
minutes had elapsed. The experimenter then instructed to participant to think about 
the instructions they had read and to practice the self-talk for a further 5-minutes. The 
standardised 5-minute to reading (5-minutes) and rehearsal (5-minutes) periods was 
used in the current study to provide participants with sufficient time to read and learn 
the self-talk. We did not want to create an extended time lag between familiarisation 
putts and performance putts as we wanted to avoid any negation of the familiarisation 
putts. The participants were instructed to use this self-talk in the 15 performance putts 
that would be used in the competition this week. As in session 1, the number of 
successful putts was recorded. In addition, between each putt the experimenter 
reminded the participant to use the self-talk. Following the 15 performance putts, 
participants completed the self-talk usability and performance facilitation questions, 
and on completion of this were asked to seal their answers in an envelope provided by 
the experimenter. This was to blind the experimenter from the perceptions of the 
participants until after all data had been collected for the study. Finally in session 2, 
participants were reminded about session 3 the following week.  
In session 3, participants completed the same protocol as in session 2, but 
received the alternate self-talk. That is, if they received the rational self-talk in session 
2, they received the irrational self-talk in session 3, and visa versa. The experimenter 
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was blinded to the content of the envelopes but recorded the envelope selection (1 or 
2) for data analyses purposes after all study data had been collected. Finally, 
participants were fully verbally debriefed as to the purpose of the study (Howitt & 
Cramer, 2011), and were given an opportunity to withdraw their data and or ask any 
questions.  
Analytic Strategy 
Prior to main analyses, data were tested for significant outliers using Shapiro 
Wilks tests.  Following past research and recommendations (e.g., Salkind, 2010), 
significant outliers of >/< 2 SDs were Windsorisedi. There were no missing data. 
Main analyses were completed in three stages. First, one-samples and paired-samples 
t-tests (including Cohen’s d effect sizes; Cohen, 1988) were completed for self-talk 
usability and performance facilitation data. This was to examine differences in 
usability and perceived performance facilitation across the rational self-talk and 
irrational self-talk conditions. Second, a two-way repeated-measures ANCOVA was 
conducted with condition (rational and irrational) and order (time 1 and time 2) as 
within-subjects factors, to examine the differences in golf putting performance across 
rational self-talk and irrational self-talk conditions, and across participants first and 
second putting performances regardless of condition. Baseline golf-putting 
performance was entered into the analysis as a covariate to account for the potential 
confounding effects of participants’ baseline putting scores on within-subjects 
differences. Finally, two paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare the putting 
scores of the rational and irrational self-talk conditions to baseline. Also, to aid 
descriptive clarity, change in golf putting performance was calculated from baseline 
for both the rational self-talk and irrational self-talk conditions, and transformed into 
percentage change variables (putting score change from baseline ÷ baseline × 100).  
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Results 
Self-talk usability  
A one-samples t-test revealed that participants reported that both the rational, 
M = 62.02, SD = 26.00, t(56) = 18.07, p < .001, and irrational, M = 53.16, SD = 31.26, 
t(56) = 12.83, p < .001, self-talk were usable for their performance. A paired-samples 
t-test revealed that participants reported higher usability, t(56) = 2.22, p = .03, d = .31, 
for the rational self-talk than the irrational self-talk (Mdifference = 8.86, SD = 30.07). 
In brief, participants felt that the rational self-talk was more usable than the irrational 
self-talk.  
Self-talk facilitation  
A one-samples t-test revealed that participants reported that both the rational, 
M = 66.67, SD = 19.00, t(56) = 26.49, p < .001, and irrational, M = 50.17, SD = 26.76, 
t(56) = 14.16, p < .001, self-talk were helpful for their performance. A paired-samples 
t-test revealed that participants reported higher putting facilitation, t(56) = 4.38, p < 
.001, d = .71, for the rational self-talk than the irrational self-talk (Mdifference = 
16.49, SD = 28.38). In brief, participants felt that the rational self-talk was more 
helpful for their putting performance than the irrational self-talk. 
Golf putting score across conditions 
 A two-way repeated-measures ANCOVA, with baseline putting performance 
serving as the covariate, revealed a significant main effect for self-talk condition, F 
(1,55) = 10.94, p = .002, hp2 = .17.  Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that golf 
putting scores were greater (hp2 = .25) in the rational self-talk condition (M = 4.53, SD 
= 1.75) than in the irrational self-talk condition (M = 3.61, SD = 1.91). There was no 
statistically significant effect for order, F (1,55) = 1.98, p = .165, hp2 = .04, and no 
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statistically significant self-talk X order interaction, F (1,55) = .32, p = .573, hp2 = .01.
   
Performance change from baseline 
A paired samples t-test revealed that golfers putted significantly better after 
using rational self-talk (M = 4.53, SD = 1.75) than they did at baseline (M = 3.32, SD 
= 1.59), t(56) = 5.42, p < .001. After using irrational self-talk (M = 3.61, SD = 1.91) 
golf putting performance did not differ significantly from baseline, t(56) = 1.12, p = 
.27. To aid descriptive clarity, on average participants recorded a 66% (SD = 100%) 
increase in putting scores from baseline when using rational self-talk, and a 33% (SD 
= 112%) increase in putting scores from baseline when using irrational self-talk.   
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the performance effects of rational and 
irrational self-talk on the putting accuracy of amateur golfers, addressing the 
shortcomings of past research in three main ways. The extant literature concerning the 
performance effects of rational and irrational self-talk is contradictory, some research 
demonstrating that irrational self-talk hinders motor performance (e.g., Bonadies & 
Bass, 1984), and research employing more robust research methods reported no 
effects (e.g., Wood et al., 2017b). Past research literature has employed laboratory 
tasks and has recruited unskilled performers, limiting the applicability of the findings 
to actual sports performance. Therefore, the present study adopted a field-based 
protocol and recruited skilled performers, as well as utilising a blinded repeated 
measures crossover design to maintain experimental rigour. It was hypothesised that 
rational self-talk would lead to greater golf putting performance scores than irrational 
self-talk and baseline levels. It was also hypothesised that rational self-talk would be 
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perceived as more useful and more facilitative for golf putting performance than 
irrational self-talk.  
In support of the first hypothesis, results indicate that when participants used 
rational self-talk, they scored more highly in the pressured golf putting task than when 
they used irrational self-talk, controlling for baseline levels. The finding that 
participants reported enhanced performance when adopting rational compared to 
irrational self-talk aligns closely with previous research (e.g., Bonadies & Bass, 1984; 
Kombos et al., 1989; Schill et al., 1978). Also, in line with the sport-specific model of 
self-talk (Van Raalte et al., 2016), when using irrational self-talk participants may 
have perceived some dissonance between the self-talk they had been asked to use and 
the self-talk they would typically use. That is, there may have been perceived conflict 
between the self-talk that feels natural in the moment, and the irrational self-talk. For 
example, some research (Wood et al., 2009) has shown that that using self-talk that 
conflicts with ones more deeply held cognitions can be detrimental to performance 
when compared with the use of self-talk that corresponds to more deeply held 
cognitions. Therefore, in the current study the irrational self-talk may have been 
perceived as less congruent with the participants usual self-talk when putting, 
compared to the rational self-talk. Based upon the findings of the current study there 
are various potential and inter-related mechanisms that could explain these 
performance differences.  
First, data showed that rational self-talk was perceived to be more usable and 
more helpful for their performance in the task. As such, we could surmise that 
participants were more likely to engage with rational self-talk statements prior to the 
task because they perceived rational self-talk as more useful, and consequently, 
performance was facilitated due to a positive self-fulfilling prophecy (Rosenthan & 
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Jacobson, 1968). Second, previous researchers (e.g., Wood, Jordet, & Wilson, 2015) 
have suggested, and some researchers (e.g., Dixon, Turner, & Gillman, 2016) have 
found, positive associations between irrational beliefs and threat cognitive appraisals 
in relation to motivated performance situation. To explain, those with a rational view 
may be less likely to make a threat appraisals due to a realistic perspective of success 
and failure (i.e., “underperforming would be bad but certainly not the end of the 
world”) and less likely to condemn themselves wholly for a behaviour (i.e., “I cannot 
be rated wholly as a failure for underperforming in a single instance”). This is 
important because threat, as opposed to challenge, is related to poorer athletic 
performance across a range of sports (e.g., Turner & Barker, 2013), including golf 
(Moore et al., 2012).  
Third, and according to binary theory of emotion, rational beliefs generate 
healthy negative emotions (i.e., concern) lower in intensity compared to irrational 
beliefs that lead to unhealthy negative emotions (i.e., anxiety), higher in intensity that 
hinder goal achievement compared to the former (Dryden & Branch, 2008; Hyland & 
Bdouszek, 2012). As such, researchers have experimentally demonstrated those 
adopting irrational beliefs report greater increases in anxiety compared to those who 
adopt rational beliefs (e.g., Harris, Davies, & Dryden, 2006). There are many studies 
that postulate and show how heightened anxiety may disrupt the execution of motor 
skill performance. One prominent theory is the conscious processing hypothesis 
(CPH; Masters, 1992), which suggests that when under heightened anxiety performers 
are more likely to reinvesting explicit skill knowledge in an attempt to maintain and 
control the movement. In skilled performers, conscious processing occurring in times 
of high anxiety may disrupt skill motor performance (Mullen, Hardy, & Oldman, 
2007). In brief, we could hypothesise that the adoption of irrational self-talk led to 
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reduced task performance by generating the unhealthy negative emotion of anxiety, 
engendering greater conscious processing of the skills, compared to rational self-talk 
and baseline. Clearly, without kinematic data or data concerning conscious processing 
or anxiety, this hypothesis is conjecture and should be examined in future research.  
The present findings extend current understanding into the effects of self-talk 
from a functional (e.g., functional vs. dysfunctional) rather than valence (i.e., positive 
vs. negative) categorisation. In addition, this study challenges the most recent and 
methodological rigorous examination into the effects of irrational and rational self-
talk on performance by Wood et al (2017b) whereby data reported no differences in 
performance and the associated outcomes (e.g., anxiety, performance efficiency). To 
explain, the use of a laboratory based setting and novice golfers though by Wood et 
al. (2017b) may have failed to imitate a real-life and meaningful scenario that is 
proposed to be fundamental when triggering irrational beliefs and the associated 
effects (Ellis, 1994). Instead, the present study used real-life and competitive golf-
putting performance task in situ with amateur golfers, thus fostering a meaningful and 
ecologically valid task. 
Further, there are some methodological limitations in the current study that if 
addressed could strengthen the findings. For example, future research should attempt 
to recruit a sex-balanced sample, given that in the current study 70% of the 
participants are male. This is important for two main reasons. First, research 
investigating REBT in sport has demonstrated that females report greater irrational 
beliefs than males (e.g., Turner, Carrington, & Miller, 2018; Turner & Allen, 2018) 
and therefore the effects of irrational beliefs on irrational and rational self-talk effects 
may be different in males than in females. Second, there is a sex-imbalance with the 
sport of golf, with only 15% of golf club members being female (England Golf, 
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2016). The current sample includes a higher proportion of female golfers than is 
reflected in the general population, but equal numbers would be ideal for more 
detailed comparisons.  
Although the current study very specifically examined the effects of rational 
and irrational self-talk on golf putting performance, this study does not examine 
rational and irrational beliefs. That is, self-talk is not the same as belief, and whilst 
self-talk is considered to be effective for cognitive control, it is not necessarily 
reflective of deeply held beliefs (Zinsser, Bunker, & Williams, 2006). Given that self-
talk may or may not reflect deeply held cognitions, it is unlikely that in the current 
study the experimental manipulation altered participants’ core beliefs. Therefore 
future research should conduct Randomised Control Trials that systematically apply 
REBT to golfers to examine changes in performance as a result of changing in 
irrational beliefs to rational beliefs.  
Further, although prior to putting performance self-talk was reinforced to 
participants, we did not measure frequency of self-talk usage (Hardy, 2006) or the 
believability of the self-talk. That is, participants may have been using the self-talk 
more or less frequently depending on personal preference, and have not believed the 
self-talk statements, and this may have influenced the results. The failure in the 
current study to discern the believability of the self-statements is in line with previous 
research on rational and irrational self-talk (e.g., Rosin & Nelson, 1983) and clearly 
should be addressed in future research. In addition, one limitation inherent in the 
study of self-talk is the inaccessibility of self-talk. In other words, we don’t know for 
sure what participants were saying to themselves during golf putting performance. In 
the present study, we gave participants 15-minutes to overtly engage with and 
rehearse the self-talk statement, and then before each putt participants were prompted 
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to use the self-talk they had been given. However, ultimately we don’t know whether 
and to what extent the self-talk was used, and even if we asked participants about 
their self-talk usage, we still would have no objective information on this matter. 
Perhaps think aloud methodologies could be incorporated into future research to 
partially mitigate this inherent limitation (e.g., Nicholls & Polman, 2008).  
Finally, the current study demonstrates performance effects of rational and 
irrational self-talk using a performance outcome indicator of successful (holed) putts. 
However, no data was collected on the mechanisms that may provide a causal link 
between rational and irrational self-talk and putting accuracy. In other words, from 
the current data it is not known why performance differences emerged. REBT 
suggests that rational beliefs generate functional emotions, whilst irrational beliefs 
generate dysfunctional emotions (Ellis & DiGiuseppe, 1993), and therefore, future 
research should measure emotional outcomes in response to rational and irrational 
self-talk. Also, research should go one step further and try to understand the 
implications of such functional and dysfunctional emotional reactions on the 
movement kinematics of golf putting under pressure. It could be hypothesised that 
irrational self-talk causes anxiety (Turner & Barker, 2013) that increases conscious 
processing (Masters, 1992), thus influencing putting kinematics and consequently 
interrupting skill execution (e.g., Toner & Moran, 2011).  
Based on the findings of the current paper, limitations notwithstanding, there 
are some practical implications that can be garnered. First, golfers might consider 
becoming more aware of their pre-shot self-talk and could consider using rational 
self-talk as part of their pre-shot routine in training and in competition. Further 
research is required, but golfers could consider viewing their self-talk not as 
positively or negatively valenced, but instead try to determine whether the self-talk is 
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functional or dysfunctional for performance. Indeed, some rational self-talk could be 
erroneously construed as ‘negative’ because it includes thoughts about failure (e.g., “I 
really would not want to failure, but that does not mean I must not, and it certainly 
would not be terrible”) but could be functional for performance nonetheless due its 
flexibility. Ideally, golfers wishing to fully explore the application of rational self-talk 
could also engage in REBT with a sport and exercise psychologist. In REBT the 
athlete engages in a structured process through which core irrational beliefs are 
discouraged and core rational beliefs are promoted (see Turner & Bennett, 2018), thus 
going beyond self-talk.  
In conclusion, the purpose of this study was to examine the performance 
effects of rational and irrational self-talk on the putting accuracy of amateur golfers. 
Results showed that participants were more accurate when using rational self-talk, 
compared to irrational self-talk, from baseline levels. The current research addressed 
the shortcomings of past research by employing more robust research methods 
(repeated measures crossover design) in a field-based data collection, and by 
recruiting skilled performers. Researchers should explore the potential mechanisms 
for greater golf putting accuracy when using rational self-talk, and examine 
interventions using REBT to enhance athletic performance.   
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Figure 1.  
Rational and irrational self-talk.  
Rational self-talk Rational beliefs 
type 
Irrational self-talk Irrational beliefs 
type 
I want to sink this but 
that doesn’t mean I 
must 
Preference I want to sink this putt 
and therefore I must’ 
Demandingness 
If I don't succeed in 
this task, it will be 
bad but not awful 
Anti-awfulizing If I don't succeed in 
this task it would be 
awful 
Awfulizing 
If I don’t succeed in 
this task, I will not 
like it, but I will be 
able to stand it 
Low frustration 
tolerance 
I would not be able to 
stand failing in this 
task 
High frustration 
tolerance 
If I fail to sink this 
putt then I will have 
failed, but that would 
not make me a failure 
Self-acceptance If I miss this putt, it 
would make me a 
failure 
 
Depreciation 
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Highlights 
• Rational self-talk led to more accurate golf putting than irrational self-talk 
• Rational self-talk was perceived as more facilitative than irrational self-talk 
• Rational self-talk was perceived as more useful than irrational self-talk 
• Improvements from baseline emerged for both rational and irrational self-talk  
 
 
 
 
 
i Baseline golf putting scores, N = 2; rational self-talk golf putting scores, N = 1; 
irrational self-talk golf putting scores, N = 3; time 2 golf putting scores, N = 2; time 3 
golf putting scores, N = 2.  
																																																													
